Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Administrative Law by Eastgage, P. Gavin
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 38 
Number 3 The Pennsylvania Issue Article 4 
2000 
Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Administrative Law 
P. Gavin Eastgage 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
P. G. Eastgage, Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Administrative Law, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 795 (2000). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol38/iss3/4 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has 






ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE - PUBLIC UTILITIES -
ELECTRicrrY - No DUTY TO NOTIFY NON-RATEPAYER LANDLORD - The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 1501 of the Public
Utility Code does not require a utility company, who disconnects
service to the property at a tenant/ratepayer's request, consequently
causing substantial damage to the property, to first notify the
landlord/property owner who was not the ratepayer and who had
not entered into a contractual arrangement with the utility to
continue service.
Rohrbaugh v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 727 A.2d
1080 (Pa. 1999).
Robert and Carola Rohrbaugh ("the Rohrbaughs") are the owners
of a residential property in Pine Grove Mills, Centre County,
Pennsylvania, which they had rented to Ethel Bisbicos ("Bisbicos")
in July of 1988.1 Bisbicos was responsible for paying all utilities,
including electricity, pursuant to the lease agreement between the
parties. Accordingly, all bills were in Bisbicos' name.2 Electrical
service was provided by West Penn Power Company ("West
* Executive Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne University
School of Law; B.S.B.A. 1994, Duquesne University.
1. Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 727 A.2d 1080, 1082 (Pa. 1999). The tenant,
Ethel Bisbicos, is identified by name only in the commonwealth court decision. See
Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 663 A.2d 809, 810 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
2. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1082.
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Penn"). 3 Bisbicos occupied the residence from July 27, 1988 until
October 31, 1989, at which time she was evicted by the Rohrbaughs
for nonpayment of rent.4 On December 4, 1989, Bisbicos contacted
West Penn and requested that electrical service be disconnected at
the property.5 She informed West Penn at that time that the
Rohrbaughs were the owners of the property.6
The West Penn representative reviewed the company's files to
determine whether the Rohrbaughs had entered into a landlord/
tenant agreement with West Penn;7 there was no such agreement
on file. As a result of Bisbicos' request, and without first contacting
the Rohrbaughs, on December 7, 1989, West Penn disconnected the
electric supply to the property.8 Consequently, the property was
without heat, and freezing temperatures at that time and for several
days after caused the pipes and radiators to burst, spilling water
throughout the property and causing substantial damage to the
residence.9 The Rohrbaughs did not discover the damage until
visiting the property on December 11, 1989; this is also the first
time they were aware of the electricity having been disconnected.10
In November 1990, the Rohrbaughs filed a civil complaint against
West Penn in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, alleging
"West Penn's disconnection of service without notification to them
as owners of the property was negligent, unreasonable and a
violation of [Public Utility Commission] regulations."11 As an
affirmative defense, West Penn answered that the Rohrbaughs'
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. No explanation was provided in the record from the commonwealth court as to
why there was a more than one month delay from the time Bisbicos vacated the premises
and her request to disconnect electric service at the rental property. Id. at 1082 n.3.
6. Id. at 1082.
7. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d 1082. In 1983, West Penn initiated a policy for landlords to
enter an agreement with the utility whereby West Penn would either disconnect service after
notice to the landlord or put service in the landlord's name and continue service in situations
where the tenant notified West Penn that the tenant no longer desired service at the rental
property. Id. The policy was adopted due to financial losses incurred as a result of tenants
vacating a residence and West Penn being forced to continue service without having the
ability to bill either the tenant who left the property or the landlord, if the landlord refused
to have service transferred to his account. Id. West Penn customers were first notified of
this option in an enclosure to monthly bills in 1983. Id. Notable in the instant case,
however, is that, although the Rohrbaughs' rental property was located in an area serviced
by West Penn, the Rohrbaughs themselves did not personally reside in an area serviced by
West Penn. Id.
8. Id.
9. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1082.
10. Id. at 1082-83.
11. Id. at 1083.
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complaint raised issues solely within the domain of the Public
Utility Commission ("PUC").12 Thereafter, West Penn filed a motion
for bifurcation, asking that the liability determination be made by
the PUC.' 3 This motion was granted by the trial court, and the
Rohrbaughs then filed their complaint with the PUC.14 The
administrative law judge ("ALJF) hearing the case ordered West
Penn to desist in its enforcement of the landlord/tenant agreement
policy until it obtained PUC approval of the policy as part of its
tariff, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Code.' 5
The ALT determined that West Penn's discontinuance of service
without notification to the Rohrbaughs was unreasonable and
inadequate service under Section 1501 of the Public Utility Code"6
and ordered West Penn to pay five hundred dollars.
1 7
West Penn filed exceptions to this order with the PUC and the
PUC reversed the ALl's ruling.' 8 Although it believed West Penn
exercised poor business judgment under the circumstances, the
PUC found that the Public Utility Code did not require West Penn
to notify non-ratepaying landlords like the Rohrbaughs of service
discontinuation. 19 When it discontinued service, West Penn provided
reasonable and adequate service to its ratepayer, tenant Bisbicos.
20
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed the
PUC, reinstating the order of the ALJ.21 The court found that, by
disconnecting electric service at the tenant's request without first
notifying the property owners, West Penn violated its statutory duty
"to provide and maintain adequate and reasonable service."22 In
dissent, Judge Dante R. Pellegrini argued that the majority's
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1083.
14. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1083.
15. Id. 52 PA CODE § 53.25 provides that:
A utility shall set forth all rules and regulations which apply generally to all classes of
service covered by the tariff, and definitions of technical terms and abbreviations used
in the tariff, the meanings of which are not common knowledge and cannot be
gathered exactly from the context in which used. Where practicable, special rules
applying to a given class of service shall be included in the rate schedule covering the
particular class.
52 PA. CODE § 53.25 (1998).
16. 66 PA- CONS. STAT. § 1501 (1999).




21. Id. The commonwealth court's opinion was published at Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 663 A.2d 809 (Pa- Commw. Ct. 1995).
22. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1083.
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expansion of the statutory duties of a utility to individuals not
paying for such services was unfounded.23
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine
"whether a utility company violates its duty to provide reasonable
and adequate service as required by Section 1501 of the Public
Utility Code where the utility company disconnects electric service
for the property at a tenant/ratepayer's request without first
notifying the landlord, who was not the ratepayer for the electric
service and who had not entered into a contractual agreement
whereby service could be continued with the account transferred to
the landlord's name after the tenant requested termination."24 The
court held that a utility company's statutory duties do not extend to
non-ratepaying landlords such as the Rohrbaughs and accordingly
reversed the commonwealth court and reinstated the PUC's order.25
The majority began by acknowledging that reversal of a PUC
order is proper only in cases where a constitutional violation, an
error of law, or a violation of PUC procedure has occurred, or
where the necessary findings of fact are unsupported by substantial
evidence.26 The court reviewed Section 1501 of the Public Utility
Code,2' 7 governing adequate and reasonable utility service, 28 along
23. Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 663 A.2d 809, 813 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1995)
(Pellegrini, J., dissenting).
24. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1083-84. At the supreme court, attorney Charles J. Weyandt
from State College represented the Rohrbaughs, attorney John W. Blasko from State College
represented West Penn, and attorneys Rhonda L. Daviston, Bohdan R. Panldw and John F
Povilaitis from Harrisburg represented the PUC. Id. at 1086.
Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote the opinion for the majority, which included Chief Justice
John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala, Ralph J. Cappy, and Thomas G. Saylor.
Id. Justice Russell M. Nigro dissented. Id. at 1086-89 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1086.
26. Id. at 1084 (citing 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §704).
27. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 reads in relevant part:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable
service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations,
substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such service and facilities as
shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its
patrons, employees, and the public. Such service also shall be reasonably continuous
and without unreasonable interruptions or delay. Such service and facilities shall be in
conformity with the regulations and orders of the commission.
66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (1999).
28. For purposes of the Public Utility Code, the term "service" encompasses numerous
activities performed by a public utility company. The term "service" is defined by statute as
follows:
Used in its broadest and most inclusive sense, includes any and all acts done,
rendered, or performed, and any and all things furnished or supplied, and any and all
facilities used, furnished, or supplied by public utilities, or contract carriers by motor
vehicle, in the performance of their duties under this part to their patrons, employees,
2000 Pennsylvania Administrative Law
with PUC regulation 56.72,29 covering procedures for
discontinuation of service.30 The court also examined the definition
of a "ratepayer" provided in the PUC regulations.31
Finding the language of the regulations to be unambiguous
concerning disconnection, the court stated that as long as the
regulation was validly enacted, the utility company does not owe a
statutory duty to non-ratepaying. landlords.32 "Here, the regulation
was adopted pursuant to the commission's legislative rule-making
power."3 The regulation is neither arbitrary nor promulgated in bad
faith, and is thus "reasonable."3 Non-ratepaying landlords desiring
notice of discontinuation of service have three options available,
they may either: 1) pay for electric service themselves; 2) file the
requisite agreement, such as that offered by West Penn, with the
public utility; or 3) incorporate a clause into the lease requiring the
tenant notify the landlord within a reasonable time of any planned
discontinuation of service so that the landlord can make
appropriate arrangements.
35
In conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
commonwealth court exceeded its proper scope of review when
other public utilities, and the public, as well as the interchange of facilities between
two or more of them ....
66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (1999).
29. 52 PA. CODE § 56.72 reads in relevant part:
A utility may discontinue service without prior written notice under the following
circumstances:
(1) Ratepayer's residence. When a ratepayer requests a discontinuance at his
residence, when the ratepayer and members of his household are the only occupants.
52 PA. CODE § 56.72 (1998).
30. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1084. "The PUC regulations distinguish between the
discontinuance and termination of service. The discontinuance of service involves 'the
cessation of service with the consent of the ratepayer and otherwise in accordance with
[section] 56.72 (relating to discontinuance of service).'" Id. (citing 52 PA.CODE § 56.2 (1998)).
"The termination of service involves the 'cessation of service, whether temporary or
permanent, without the consent of the ratepayer."' Id. "The parties did not dispute the
distinction, since the ratepayer/tenant, requested that service be discontinued." Id. at 1084
n.7.
31. 52 PA. CODE § 56.2 defines a ratepayer as
[a] person in whose name a residential service account is listed and who is primarily
responsible for payment of bills rendered for the service. For the purposes of
establishing credit, this term includes a transfer of service from a residence or
dwelling within the service area of the utility or a reinstitution of service at the same
location within 60 days following termination or discontinudnce of service.
52 PA_ CODE § 56.2 (1998).
32. Rohrbaugh, 727 A-2d at 1085.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1086.
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reversing the PUC's order, and held that the Public Utility Code and
related regulations did not obligate West Penn to notify
non-ratepaying landlords that 'service was being disconnected at
their property."
Justice Russell M. Nigro dissented, arguing that the tenant in the
instant case was not a "ratepayer" for purposes of the PUC's
regulations because Bisbicos vacated the rental property and as
such the property was not her "residence" at the time she
requested the electricity be disconnected. 3 Justice Nigro also
opined that West Penn did not follow procedures to verify that the
property was unoccupied and failed to post a discontinuation
notice as required by the Code.
3
The Rohrbaugh decision appropriately clarifies the
responsibilities of utilities in Pennsylvania. It signals landlords to
include language in their lease agreements requiring tenants to
provide them with notice that the tenant is vacating the premises
or the tenant is requesting utilities to be disconnected; in the
alternative, the landlord should have the appropriate landlord/
tenant agreement on file with the utility.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE - OFFICERS AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - VETERANS' PREFERENCE ACT -
MILITARY AFFAIRS ACT - CIVIL SERVICE ACT - The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the State Civil Service Commission has
standing to enforce the veterans' preference provisions of the
Military Affairs Act sua sponte, and that a housing authority
violated the Act when it failed to first offer the open executive
position to a qualified veteran candidate.
Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State
Civil Service Commission, 730 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1999).
In February of 1993, an Executive Director of the Housing
Authority of the County of Chester ("Housing Authority")
resigned.39 The following month, the Housing Authority requested
the State Civil Service Commission ("Commission") begin the
process to fill the vacant Executive Director Three position.40 John
J. Fitzgerald, a veteran, and Troy L. Chapman, a non-veteran, both
36. Id.
37. Rohrbaugh, 727 A.2d at 1086-89 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1088-89 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
39. Housing Auth. of the Cty. of Chester v. Pa. State Civil Serv. Comnm'n, 730 A-2d 935,
937 (Pa. 1999).
40. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 k2d at 937.
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met the minimum experience and training requirements and tested
for the position, along with several other candidates.4' Fitzgerald
received a test score of 91.00 points, after ten additional points
were added to his raw score of 81.00 points, as required by the
Veterans' Preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act.
4
1
Chapman received a raw score of 82.00 points." Fitzgerald and
Chapman appeared on the list of eligible candidates for the
position, both within the "Rule-of-Three."" On July 3, 1995, the
Housing Authority appointed the non-veteran, Chapman, to the
Executive Director Three position.
45
In August 1995, the Commission audited the list of eligible
candidates. 46 A Commission chief thereafter informed the Housing
Authority's Director that the appointment of a non-veteran to the
position was not in compliance with the Commission's regulations
or the veterans' preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act.
47
The Commission informed the Housing Authority that, where an
available veteran is within the Rule-of-Three, the veteran must be
granted appointment preference. 48 The Housing Authority believed
that it did not violate either the Military Affairs Act or the Civil
Service Act and reaffurned its decision to appoint the non-veteran
who it believed to be more qualified for the position.4
9
41. Id.
42. Id. The constitutionality of the ten-point add-on, required by 51 PA. CONS. STAT. §
7103(a), is not at issue in the case. Id. n.3.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 938. The "Rule-of-Three" found in Section 602 of the Civil Service Act
provides in relevant part:
If the vacant position is to be filled from among the names of persons certified from
the employment list by the director of the appointing authority, he shall elect a person
from among the three highest ranking persons for the class of position to be filled
PA STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.602 (West 1990); see also 4 PA. CODE § 91.3 (1994).
45. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 938.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Military Affairs Act is codified at 51 PA CONS. STAT. §§ 7101-7109 (1990).
Section 7104(b) provides:
Preference in appointment or promotion.
(b) Name on civil service list.-Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite
qualifications, and his name appears on any eligible or promotional list, certified or
furnished as the result of any such civil service examination, the appointing or
promoting power in making an appointment or promotion to a public position shall
give preference to such soldier, notwithstanding, that his name does not stand highest
on the eligible or promotional list.
51 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7104(b) (1990).
48. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 938.
49. Id.
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Pursuant to statute,50 the Commission initiated a hearing to
assess whether the non-veteran's appointment complied with
Pennsylvania law.51 The Commission concluded that the Military
Affairs Act requires that the qualified veteran be offered the
position over the non-veteran and entered an order requiring the
Housing Authority to offer the position to Fitzgerald.52
The Housing Authority appealed the validity of the order to the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, arguing first that the
Commission lacked standing to enforce the veterans' preference
provisions sua sponte, and second that the Commission erred in its
interpretation of the Military Affairs Act requiring veterans'
preference for the position at issue.- On March 12, 1997, the
commonwealth court reversed the Commission's order, finding that
while the Commission had standing to enforce compliance with the
preference provisions, its interpretation of the provisions was in
error.M Relying on Brickhouse v. Spring-Ford Area School
District,5 the court ruled that the Housing Authority could employ
its own criteria in determining the requisite qualifications for the
position.56 The Commission appealed, and on December 19, 1997,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur.
57
Taking the issues in order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
addressed whether, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
Legislature could confer standing upon the Commission under the
Civil Service Act to enforce sua sponte the veterans' preference
provisions of the Military Affairs Act.58 Holding that the standing
requirement in Penn'y1vania' Constitution, Article V, Sections 1
and 2, is interpreted differently from the analysis under Article III
of the United States Constitution, the supreme court affirmed the
50. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(d) (West 1990).
51. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at. 938.
52. Id. at 938-39.
53. Id. at 939.
54. Id. The commonwealth court's opinion was published at Housing Auth. of the Cty.
of Chester v. Pa. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 692 A.2d 1122 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
55. 656 A.2d 483 (Pa. 1995).
56. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 939.
57. Id. At the supreme court, attorney John Spangler from West Chester represented
the Housing Authority, and attorneys Frederick C. Smith, Jr. and Edward J. Bohan from
Harrisburg represented the Commission. Id. at 937.
Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote the opinion for the court, which included Chief Justice
John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justice Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. Justice Thomas G. Saylor
joined this opinion except for its discussion of the Housing Authority's standing. Id. at 950
(Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Stephen A. Zappala dissented, joined by Justices Ralph J.




commonwealth court and found that the legislature may provide
the Commission with authority to enforce the veterans' preference
provisions sua sponte5 9
Second, the court found that the Legislature, in Section 203 of
the Civil Service Act,60 gave the Commission the power to enforce
both the provisions of the Civil Service Act and any rules and
regulations adopted under that Act.61  In this regard, the
Commission created Management Directive 580.21 Amended,
62
which itself incorporates the veterans' preference provisions from
section 7104(b) of the Military Affairs Act.6 Therefore, the court
stated that the crux of the matter is therefore whether the
Management Directive was validly enacted by the Comnission.4
The court held that the Management Directive, incorporating the
provisions from the Military Affairs Act, was adopted pursuant to
the Commission's legislative rule-making power given to it in
Section 203 of the Civil Service Act, and conformed to the
statement of purpose in the Civil Service Act.6 By enacting
Management Directive 580.21 Amended, the court found the
Commission followed the legislature's intent in giving veterans
mandatory preference in appointment when their names appear
alongside non-veterans on a list of eligibles.
66
Third, the court assessed whether the Commission properly
59. Id. at 940-41.
60. Section 203 of the Civil Service Act sets forth:
It shall be the duty of members of the commission as a body...
(3) [t]o make investigations on its own motion and, in its discretion, on petition of a
citizen concerning any matter touching the enforcement and effect of the provisions
of this act and to require observance of the provisions of this act and the rules and
regulations thereunder.
PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203(3) (West 1990).
61. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 941.
62. Management Directives are issued pursuant to Title 4 of the Pennsylvania Code and
are equivalent to regulations or executive orders inasmuch as they are issued "under or
pursuant to the laws of this Commonwealth." Id. at 941 n.15.
Management Directive 580.21 Amended provides in part: 2. POLICY Veterans'
preference applies to appointment only, as follows: a. Persons entitled to veterans'
preference under the Military Affairs Act who take civil service examinations for
appointment will:
(1) Receive 10 additional points on their final earned ratings.
(2) Have mandatory appointment preference over non-veterans when their names
appear together within the Rule-of-Three on employment certifications.
Id. at 942.
63. Id. at 942.
64. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 942.
65. Id. at 942-43.
66. Id. at 943-44.
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interpreted the Management Directive, and the Military Affairs Act
from which it derives, in requiring the Housing Authority to appoint
Fitzgerald, the sole veteran candidate, to the position.67 The court
found that the commonwealth court's application of Brickhouse v.
Spring-Ford Area School District to the instant matter was
misplaced.6 it determined that, when construed in conjunction with
section 7104(b) of the Military Affairs Act, section 7103(a) of the
Veterans' Preference Act:
clearly requires that mandatory veterans' preference be
afforded to any veteran who is applying for a civil service
position and who is on an Eligible List due to his performance
on the civil service examination. The appointing authority may
not impose additional threshold requirements under the guise
that it is setting forth the "requisite qualifications". .69
Lastly, the court examined the constitutionality of section
7104(b) of the Military Affairs Act.70 Finding that the veterans'
preference applies to all appointments, entry-level or otherwise, the
court found the statute operated in a constitutional manner.
71
Notably, the court distinguished between appointment to a civil
service position as opposed to promotion from within the agency.
72
The veterans' preference is constitutional in the appointment
context but not in the promotion context.73 In promotions, all
candidates have developed skills relative to the 'promotion they
seek in the same environment and therefore military experience is
not probative. 74 Alternatively, in the appointment context where
none of the candidates have experience relative to the position
they are seeking, the legislature has rationally found that the fact
that one has military experience justifies viewing him as the
superior candidate for the position.7
5
Justice Thomas G. Saylor filed a concurring opinion questioning
the majority's examination of the standing issue, believing it to be
unnecessary and viewing the Commission's ability to enforce the
provisions of the Military Affairs Act as merely a question of
67. Id. at 944.
68. Id. at 944-46.
69. Housing Auth. of Chester, 730 A.2d at 947.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 947-48.
72. Id. at 949.
73. Id.




authority under the Civil Service Act.76
Justice Stephen A. Zappala filed a dissenting opinion, in which he
criticized the majority's finding that the Commission possessed
authority to enforce the veterans' preference provisions of the
Military Affairs Act.77
The Housing Authority of Chester decision defines the
Commission's ability to enforce the Military Affairs Act and clarifies
the procedure for offering open positions to qualified veterans.
76. Id. at 950 (Saylor, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting).
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